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Abstract 
This paper describes two novel experiments that investigate the 
cognitive basis of surprise in stories depicting simple, everyday 
events. Participants were asked to read a number of short 
scenarios, each of which concluded with some surprise event 
for the central protagonist. The story versions differed in how 
strongly they predicted this ‘surprise’ conclusion, by varying 
the degree of attention drawn to key enabling conditions for 
that conclusion. The effect of this manipulation on participants’ 
surprise ratings, and the speed with which they read the final 
sentence, were used as dependent measures. The results of our 
experiments show that the specific representations built by 
people in understanding the earlier part of a story have definite 
effects on their level of surprise at later events. Furthermore, the 
pattern of reading times for the target sentences supports the 
explanation given for these differences. We discuss the 
consistency of these findings with theories of discourse 
comprehension and describe how such effects might be 
modelled computationally. 
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Introduction 
As well as being one of the most basic and universal of 
emotions, surprise has long been recognised as a fundamental 
building block of human cognition (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 
1972). Despite this, cognitive investigations of surprise, 
which move beyond the physiological and affective domain, 
have only recently emerged (e.g. Fisk, 2002; Schützwohl, 
1998; Teigen & Keren, 2003). The occurrence of surprise in 
narrative comprehension presents a good starting point for 
tackling this complex phenomenon, as it is undoubtedly an 
important and central aspect of many stories. Surprise, for 
instance, has been shown to be vital in determining the 
perceived interestingness of a piece of text (e.g. Iran-Nejad, 
1987; Kim, 1999); very few best-sellers describe the hero 
going to the office, working all day and then coming home 
and going to bed. Instead, writers often maintain a reader’s 
interest with well-timed surprises; for instance, Raymond 
Chandler’s murder discovery scenes often describe the dead 
body obliquely (e.g., a brown loafer protruding from the 
curtain), so that the reader’s surprise at discovering the 
referent (i.e., that the shoe is attached to a corpse) mirrors the 
detective’s surprise at discovering the body.  
In this paper, we try to elucidate the cognitive basis of 
surprise in understanding narrative. Evidently, a person 
should be surprised when something unexpected occurs in an 
event sequence. However, as discussed in the next section, 
the relationship between expectation and surprise is not quite 
so clear-cut. We examine the hypothesis that a surprising 
event is unexpected relative to a reader’s mental 
representation of the sequence. In other words, when reading 
a story, a person’s level of surprise should be determined by 
whether or not the specific conditions supporting the 
surprising event were built into their representation as the 
prior narrative was comprehended.  
Surprise and Expectations 
At a cognitive level, surprise is intuitively related to 
expectations, and as such the Oxford English dictionary 
defines it as “an unexpected occurrence or event”. However, 
this may not be a straightforward relationship due to differing 
interpretations of what it means to expect something. Teigen 
& Keren (2003) observe that in cognitive psychology, 
expectations are usually quantified in terms of probabilities; 
i.e. an unexpected event is considered to be a low probability 
outcome. Yet, events that have an equal likelihood of 
occurring are not always judged to be equally surprising by 
an observer (e.g. Schackle, 1969). Surprise then, might not be 
due to the low probability of an outcome, but to its degree of 
contrast with a more likely, but disconfirmed, expectation. 
The Expectancy-Disconfirmation hypothesis, (Meyer 
Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 1997), similarly suggests that 
surprise is experienced when expectations based on 
preexisting schemas fail to be confirmed. If we apply these 
ideas to the area of discourse comprehension, then surprise is 
likely to occur when a predicted sequence of events in a story 
is violated or deviated from in a significant way.  
While little research has investigated the conditions which 
evoke surprise in narrative, a lot of work has examined 
people’s ability to form forward inferences during reading 
(e.g., Klin et al., 1999; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). These 
inferences operate by linking representations of the text with 
background knowledge to predict a likely outcome, thus 
facilitating the comprehension process. It seems feasible that 
when people read a familiar event sequence in a story, they 
are able to make predictions about what will happen next. 
According to Schank & Abelson (1977), this is done by 
means of script-based schemas. For example, when reading 
the scenario “The cup of coffee was balanced on the arm of 
the chair. Suddenly, Richard sneezed.”, most people can 
predict that Richard’s sneeze will cause the cup of coffee to 
spill or be knocked off the chair. If the reader subsequently 
discovers that a cat on Richard’s knee jumps up and scratches 
him, they will probably be surprised at this ending, as, despite 
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 being plausible, it does not fit in well with the expected causal 
sequence.  
Grimes-Maguire & Keane (2004) asked people to provide 
either a predictable or a creative ending to simple two- 
sentence scenarios like the above example. It was found that 
even when participants were told to be creative, they were 
constrained by their background knowledge, as the endings 
they gave to the scenarios overlapped significantly with those 
generated by people asked to give predictable endings. This 
suggests that participants found it quite difficult to avoid 
considering the typical outcomes to such sequences, even 
when they were instructed to provide novel endings. 
However, Grimes-Maguire & Keane (2004) explicitly asked 
participants to form an expectation, so this work does not 
address the issue of whether readers automatically anticipate 
events during reading, i.e. by making a forward inference. 
Some researchers propose that such ‘on-line’ expectations are 
rarely formed, because making predictions about events that 
may never happen is an uneconomical reading strategy 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). Nevertheless, a wealth of 
empirical evidence has suggested that under certain 
conditions people do make forward inferences (e.g. Calvo, 
2000; Fincher-Kiefer, 1996; Klin et al., 1999). The emerging 
consensus today is that readers can anticipate outcomes, but 
only in highly predictable scenarios. For example, when 
reading the sentence “He threw the delicate porcelain vase at 
the wall” most will infer that “the vase broke” (Klin et al, 
1999).  
If we assume a direct relationship between expectation and 
surprise, then readers should only experience surprise when 
an explicitly represented, highly predictable event in a 
discourse fails to subsequently occur (leading to a 
disconfirmed expectation). This also means that the degree to 
which a reader’s story representation supports a prediction, as 
mediated by events in the preceding discourse, should 
critically influence their level of perceived surprise at future 
unfolding events. This is the hypothesis tested by the current 
research. 
Expecting a Surprise 
In examining this hypothesis, there is one further issue that is 
unique to surprise in discourse comprehension. Readers who 
form expectations in the story context are probably operating 
off at least two distinct types of knowledge:  
(i) Knowledge about the causal structure of the world derived 
from direct and vicarious experience (e.g. Trabasso & van 
den Broek, 1985)  
(ii) Knowledge of story structure (e.g. Stein & Glenn, 1979). 
It seems likely that these two types of knowledge drive 
comprehension, influencing the reader’s representation, and 
determining whether or not a forward inference will be made. 
Rapp & Gerrig (2002) have provided evidence for a 
comparable distinction between ‘reality-driven’ and ‘plot-
driven’ analysis in reading. In practice, this means that in the 
story context, readers are more sensitive to depicted details 
that may set up subsequent surprises. The author has the 
power to control the amount of information given to the 
reader about an upcoming surprise, and subtle differences in 
narration can have a great impact on the reader’s 
representation of events. For example in murder mysteries, if 
a room is described as having a gun hanging over the 
mantelpiece, there is often an inevitability about its 
subsequent use. We could say that in such cases, readers can 
‘predict’ the surprise, since the enabling conditions for an 
expectation have been built into their representation.  
Overview of Experiments 
We wished to establish whether a reader’s surprise is related 
to the degree to which they can represent expectations about 
the end event in a story. Few previous studies have examined 
both of these factors together. We devised a variety of short 
scenarios which differed in how strongly they set up the final, 
‘surprising’ sentence (Experiment 1). The dependent 
variables were the time taken to read the concluding sentence 
(to determine whether the appropriate forward inference had 
been made) and a rating of surprise for the ending. Three 
variants of the story scenario were used: Predictable, Neutral 
and Unpredictable. We hypothesised that participants would 
register progressively more surprise across these conditions in 
the order shown, even though we envisaged that the relevant 
explicit forward inference would only be made in the 
Predictable condition. We also examined what happened 
when an enabling condition for the concluding sentence was 
‘undone’ (Exp. 2)  
Experiment 1 
In this experiment we manipulated the amount of information 
that was given to the reader about an upcoming surprise for 
the central protagonist. We did this by creating short 
scenarios in which only the second sentence was changed in 
each version. This sentence varied in how strongly it 
predicted the story ending. There were three different 
conditions: 1) Predictable, in which the sentence described a 
specific event for enabling the surprise conclusion for the 
protagonist, 2) Neutral, in which the sentence hinted at the 
upcoming surprise by containing vague information about the 
enabling event, and 3) Unpredictable, which did not include 
any information about the enabling condition, instead 
describing some irrelevant event. The difference between 
these three conditions is illustrated in the sample scenario in 
Table 1. 
Pre-test 
Before the main experiment, it was necessary to carry out a 
pre-test in order to ensure that the three conditions differed 
significantly in how strongly they predicted the story 
conclusion. Fifteen participants were presented with a booklet 
containing 20 short stories in each of their three versions 
(Predictable, Neutral and Unpredictable). Participants were 
then instructed to rate each version of the story for how 
strongly they felt it predicted the final sentence on a scale of 
1-7 (with 1 denoting a very unpredictable ending and 7 
denoting a very predictable ending). A one-way, repeated 
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 measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition 
in these ratings both by-participants (F1(2,28) = 241.069; 
p<0.001; MSe = 0.291), and by-materials (F2(2,38) = 
378.230; p<0.001; MSe = 0.247). As expected, the 
Predictable condition received the highest ratings (M = 6.05) 
followed by the Neutral (M = 4.22) and the Unpredictable (M 
= 1.74) conditions. 
Method 
Participants Thirty-six people (aged between 20-58 yrs) 
voluntarily participated in the experiment.  
 
Materials Eighteen short stories were randomly selected 
from the original set of 20 used in the pre-test. Each story was 
five sentences long with the fifth sentence depicting an 
ending to the scenario. The different conditions were 
determined by changing the second sentence accordingly, as 
can be seen in Table 1. The final sentence in each story was 
modified to be 10-11 syllables long, thus allowing us to make 
reliable comparisons of reading times across the materials. 
 
Table 1: Sample scenario from Experiment 1  
 
John was drinking coffee in the sitting room.   
The cup was balanced on the armchair (Predictable). 
He put the cup of coffee down (Neutral). 
He started to read the paper (Unpredictable). 
He wasn’t feeling very well.   
Suddenly he sneezed.   
**The cup of coffee spilt all over the carpet.** 
 
Design A Within-Participants design was used for the main 
experimental manipulation of condition (or story version). 
Each participant read a randomly selected set of eighteen 
stories: six Predictable, six Neutral and six Unpredictable.  
 
Procedure and Scoring Instructions for the task were 
displayed on a computer screen, as follows: “You will be 
asked to read a number of short stories (each with 5 
sentences). These will be presented sentence-by-sentence on 
the screen. When you have finished reading a sentence, press 
the spacebar to display the next sentence. Please read each 
story carefully. At the end of each story you will be asked 
how surprising you found the final sentence. You can do this 
by choosing a number between 1 and 7, where 1 means a very 
unsurprising sentence and 7 means a highly surprising 
sentence.” Below these instructions was a depiction of a 7-
point scale, which ranged from 1 (Very Unsurprising) to 7 
(Highly Surprising). After reading the instructions, the 
participants were given a practice trial, which consisted of 
two stories in the same format as the main experiment. On 
completion of the practice trial, they commenced the 
experiment. The stories were presented in a different random 
order to each participant. 
Error responses were excluded from the data prior to 
analysis (e.g., miss-keyed presses). Also, in the reading time 
data, responses deemed too fast (i.e. below 300ms) or too 
slow (i.e. above 10000ms) were omitted. Any responses that 
were above 3 standard deviations of a participant’s mean 
response time were excluded as well. This resulted in a total 
of 5% of the data being omitted from the analysis.  
Results  
As expected, participants’ surprise ratings systematically 
varied with the degree of attention given to the enabling 
condition for the surprising event. Furthermore, the reading 
time data supports the proposal that forward inferences are 
only made in predictable situations.  
 
Surprise ratings Figure 1 shows the mean surprise ratings 
given across the three conditions. A one-way, repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference between 
these conditions, using both participants (F1(2,70) = 60.518; p 
< 0.001; MSe = 0.407) and materials (F2(2,34) = 21.353; p < 
0.001; MSe = 0.563) as random factors. Post-hoc analysis 
showed that all three conditions differed significantly; the 
endings of the Predictable stories were judged as the least 
surprising (M = 2.806), followed by the Neutral (M = 3.819) 
and then the Unpredictable (M = 4.444) story endings. Non-
parametric analysis using Page’s trend test revealed a reliable 
trend for the Predictable < Neutral < Unpredictable ordering 
of conditions by-participants (L1(2) = 487; p <0.001), and by-
materials (L2(2) = 238; p <0.001).  
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Reading times for concluding sentence It was expected that 
the reading times for the story ending would reflect forward 
inferences made about the surprising event. If the early 
sentences strongly suggest a particular outcome, then that 
outcome should be partially or wholly represented, making 
reading times for the concluding sentence faster. A one-way 
ANOVA repeated measures did reveal a reliable main effect 
of condition by-participants (F1(2,70) = 4.971; p<0.05; MSe = 
321627.5), but not by-materials (F2(2,34) = 2.582; p>0.05; 
MSe = 291331.8). However, pairwise comparisons using a 
one-tailed dependent t-test revealed a significant difference 
between the Predictable and Neutral conditions across both 
participants (t1(35) = 2.5216; p <0.01) and materials (t2(17) = 
2.076; p <0.05). This difference was also observed between 
the Predictable and Unpredictable conditions (t1(35) = 3.189; 
Figure 1: Mean surprise ratings given across Predictable, 
Neutral and Unpredictable story versions (Exp.1) 
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 p<0.01; t2(17) = 1.799; p<0.05). The Neutral and 
Unpredictable conditions did not differ. This shows that 
overall, the mean reading times for the Predictable condition 
(M = 3106.05) were reliably different to both the Neutral (M 
= 3298.31) and Unpredictable (M = 3445.31) conditions. 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 show that varying the type of 
information given about an enabling event for the story 
conclusion had a significant impact on the reader’s 
representation of the scenario. The three different conditions 
resulted in qualitatively different surprise ratings for the same 
ending. Also readers were faster to read the conclusion in the 
Predictable condition, which suggests that they were making 
forward inferences about what was about to happen. This 
result is notable given that the only difference between the 
stories was the second sentence, which had the same number 
of syllables in each condition and which contained no 
contradictory information across the three versions.  
The most interesting finding of this experiment is that 
surprise and expectancy do not appear to have a linear 
relationship. While readers only seem to form an ‘on-line’ 
expectation in highly predictable scenarios (as illustrated by 
faster reading times of the conclusion), they can nevertheless 
experience qualitatively different levels of surprise across the 
three conditions.  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, it is worth noting that the surprise ratings 
given for the Neutral condition (which provides a generalised 
enabling condition for the surprise event) sit roughly midway 
between those given for the Predictable condition (which 
provides the key enabling condition) and the Unpredictable 
condition (which gives little indication of an enabling 
condition).  Presumably, reading stories in the Neutral version 
leads to some representation of the enabling condition for the 
outcome event, hence the reduced level of surprise. If this 
proposal is true, then it should be possible to increase 
perceived surprise in the Neutral condition if we explicitly 
undo that enabling event. For example, by saying “John went 
to turn on the TV” we might imply to the reader that John has 
moved away from the cup of coffee in order to turn on the 
television (see Table 2). In our second experiment, we tested 
this hypothesis by examining the effects of such an ‘Undoing’ 
condition with the Predictable and Neutral conditions. We 
expected that the increasing trend in surprise should be as 
follows: Predictable < Neutral < Undoing. On the issue of 
reading times for the concluding sentence, as in Experiment 
1, we expected the Predictable condition to yield faster times 
than both the Neutral and Undoing conditions, because the 
representation of stories in this condition should induce 
forward inferences. 
 
Table 2: Sample scenario for Experiment 2 
 
John was drinking coffee in the sitting room.  
The cup was balanced on the armchair.  
He started to read the paper. (Predictable). 
He put the cup of coffee down.  
He started to read the paper. (Neutral).  
He put the cup of coffee down.  
He went to turn on the TV. (Undoing).  
He wasn’t feeling very well. 
Suddenly, he sneezed.  
** The cup of coffee spilt all over the carpet. ** 
Comprehension Question: Was John feeling sick? 
 
Method 
Participants Fifty-nine undergraduate Computer Science 
students from University College Dublin (17-20 yrs) 
participated in this experiment for partial course credit. 
 
Materials Fifteen stories were used based on the stories in 
Experiment 1 (the remaining three were difficult to modify to 
meet the constraints of this experiment). Each story had six 
sentences, where the second and third sentence varied in each 
condition. In the Predictable and Neutral conditions the 
second sentence was the same as the analogous conditions in 
the previous experiment, while the third sentence included 
irrelevant information that did not relate to the story 
conclusion (this was to ensure that all versions of the story 
were the same length). In the Undoing condition, sentence 2 
was the same as in the Neutral version of the story, while 
sentence 3 undid the events of the second sentence, as can be 
seen in Table 2. We also included a comprehension question 
for each scenario to ensure participants would read the story 
carefully. 
 
Design As in Experiment 1, the design was Within-
Participants, where each participant was randomly assigned to 
read fifteen stories: five Predictable, five Neutral and five 
Undoing scenarios. 
 
Procedure and Scoring The procedure was the same as that 
used in Experiment 1, with the addition that participants were 
Figure 2: Reading times for final sentence across the 
Predictable, Neutral and Unpredictable conditions (Exp.1)
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 also asked a simple question about each story after making 
their surprise rating. This question required a yes or a no 
answer, indicated by pressing Y or N on the keyboard. As 
before, participants were given a practice session and all 
materials were randomly ordered. Following the procedure in 
the first experiment, 3.1% of the total data was discarded 
prior to analysis.  
Results and Discussion 
The predictions made for this experiment were confirmed by 
the expected trend in surprise ratings and the pattern of 
reading times for the final sentence (see Figures 3 and 4). 
 
Surprise ratings A one-way, repeated measures ANOVA 
examining the surprise ratings showed a main effect of 
condition, using both participants (F1(2,116) = 47.7608; MSe 
= 0.738; p<0.0001), and materials (F2(2,28) = 13.989; MSe = 
0.627; p<0.0001) as random factors. Page’s trend test also 
revealed a significant trend for the ordering across the 
conditions (Predictable < Neutral <Undoing) for participants 
(L1(2) = 772.5; p<0.001), and materials (L2(2) = 199; p 
<0.001). As in Experiment 1, the Predictable condition 
induced the lowest surprise rating (M = 3.07) followed by the 
Neutral (M= 4.27) and Undoing (M = 4.51) conditions. 
Overall, it should be noted that while the Undoing condition 
conforms to the predicted trend, it is not as markedly different 
to the Neutral condition as the Predictable one. 
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Reading times for conclusion A one-way, repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition for 
reading times of the concluding sentence, by-participants 
(F1(2,116) = 7.456; MSe = 158614.6; p<0.001), and by-
materials (F2(2,28) = 4.239; MSe = 72031.61; p <0.05). Post-
hoc analysis showed that the Predictable (M = 1867.08) 
differed significantly from the Neutral (M= 2102.654) and the 
Undoing (M = 2125.468) conditions, but the latter two 
conditions were not reliably different. This result follows that 
of Experiment 1, suggesting that participants only make 
inferences in predictable situations. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of this research was to explore the cognitive basis of 
surprise in understanding simple stories. The results indicate 
that target events will be judged as surprising relative to the 
degree to which they are specifically supported in a reader’s 
representation. This is achieved by the presence of enabling 
conditions and forward inferences. In our Predictable story 
versions, an explicit forward inference appears to be made 
about the concluding event, making it less surprising, and 
quicker to read. In our Neutral versions, a forward inference 
does not appear to be made (reading times are much slower), 
but the presence of implicit enabling conditions in the 
representation impacts the surprise ratings given. When these 
enabling conditions are absent (as in the Unpredictable 
condition), or undone (as in the Undoing condition), overall 
surprise ratings are the highest. These results are quite 
consistent with models of comprehension and are currently 
the focus of computational modelling work being carried out 
by the authors. 
A Changing Representation 
The findings of these experiments illustrate that the type of 
information presented in a story can lead the reader to build a 
unique representation of the depicted events. This result is 
supportive of the Situation Model of comprehension (Zwaan 
& Radvansky, 1998), which holds that when presented with a 
story, readers do not just passively absorb what is on the page 
in front of them, but instead build up a rich representation of 
the depicted scenario. They make assumptions about the 
central characters, their goals and actions, and even form a 
mental picture of the location and time in which the story is 
set. This detailed representation is achieved by calling upon 
the wealth of background knowledge readers have about the 
world, and is highly sensitive to the way in which the 
information is presented. We have also seen that, in turn, this 
representation strongly determines whether subsequent events 
will appear to be surprising or not, based on the degree to 
which they are supported by prior events in the discourse.  
Figure 3: Mean surprise ratings given across Predictable, 
Neutral and Undoing conditions (Exp. 2) 
Figure 4: Reading time for final sentence for the 
Predictable, Neutral and Undoing conditions (Exp. 2)
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 Our results illustrate that while anything that is expected 
will be judged as unsurprising, not everything unexpected 
will be judged as equally surprising. We found that even 
though explicit expectations were only formed in the 
Predictable condition, readers in both experiments could in 
fact distinguish between the various levels of predictability 
depicted across the three story versions (as was evident in the 
different surprise ratings). This suggests that expectation and 
surprise are represented differently in the reader’s mind. 
We have begun to model these effects in an extension of a 
previous model of plausibility judgements (see Connell & 
Keane, 2003; 2004), which creates inference paths in order to 
connect the events in a discourse. The key question for our 
extension of this model is how to relate the representations 
that people build to the surprise ratings that they generate for 
certain events. Based on the results of our experiments, it 
would seem that there are two separate processes taking 
place: One process occurs during reading and involves 
building an up-to-date representation of the narrative 
situation. This process controls the formation of forward 
inferences when the discourse is highly suggestive of a 
particular outcome. The other process occurs after reading, 
when the reader must make a surprise judgement. Here, they 
must assess their representation in order to search for any 
information (i.e. enabling conditions) that is consistent with 
the surprising event. By formalising these two processes, we 
hope to make clear the distinction between expectation 
formation and surprise in narrative. 
Concluding Comments 
In this paper we have outlined two novel experiments that 
examine the interplay between predictability and surprise in 
reading. This research highlights the fact that text 
comprehension is dependent not only on our background 
knowledge of the real world, but on the expectations we have 
regarding story structure. People often ‘expect’ surprises 
when reading, but the degree to which they do this is 
mediated by the amount of information provided to them by 
the author. By better understanding the nature of this, we 
hope to achieve a more in-depth understanding about the 
complex nature of event representation in discourse. 
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